JUDGE MAYER SULZBERGER
II*
CASES ON POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

Although Judge Sulzberger in his political views was regarded by many as a conservative, even a reactionary by some,
an examination of his judicial decisions indicates a complete understanding of the history and theory of government, a real desire to safeguard the sanctity of the ballot, and almost a reformer's zeal to prevent corruption by office-holders. Traces of the
originality and research which characterize his studies dealing
with the government and polity of the ancient Hebrews 40 can be
fotmd in a few of the reported decisions relating to the status of
American political parties, the qualifications and obligations of
public officials, and the right of suffrage.
(a) PoliticalParties
In a leading case decided in 19i2,41 the Judge reviewed the

historical development of national and state political parties in
this country, and discussed the right of the legislature to recognize national rather than state parties in selecting majority and
minority representation among election officers.
It was argued that state political parties by such legislation
were denied the equal protection of the laws accorded to national
parties, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The Judge, at the conclusion of a very learned opinion, declared that the Fourteenth Amendment has no bearing on the
question at issue; that the object of the Amendment is to secure
equality of rights to "any person" within the jurisdiction of the
state and to enforce the doctrine that all persons are equal before
the law; and that political parties, though composed of persons,
are not themselves persons, either in fact or in law. He said:
*The first part of this article appeared in the UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
LAw RmE-v for December, 1926.
"o
See THE Am HAARETz and THE POLITY OF THE ANCIENT HEBREws.
4
Kille v. Woodruff, 21 Pa. D. R. 207 (1912).
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"While under the Fourteenth Amendment one natural
person is to have the same rights as all other natural persons, this is not true of political parties. The essence of party
government is that the majority party has the right to enforce its policies and to annul the policies of the minority
party. In other words, while persons have the right of
equality, parties have the right of inequality."
(b) The Public Office-Holder
A municipal employee, who had been discharged for pernicious political activity, petitioned Judge Sulzberger for a writ
to compel the Director of Public Works to reinstate him.42 An
43
act of the legislature, commonly known as the "Shern Law,"

provided that a city office-holder should be discharged if he should
take any active part in political management or in political campaigns, or use his office to influence political movements, or interfere with elections, etc. Another act of the legislature, adopted
at the same session and a short time after the Shern Law, forbade
the discharge of an employee for a cause "religious or political."44
It was argued by the petitioner that the two acts were repugnant,
that the former was by implication repealed by the latter, and
-that the Shern Law was unconstitutional.
The judge in his opinion pointed out that there is no repugnancy between the two acts of the legislature, and that there could
be no possible implied repeal of the Shern Law. When an employee is discharged for political activity, the cause for discharge
is not "political," within the meaning of the legislature, because
it is not the political sentiments of the employee that bring about
his removal. "If he perform the prohibited acts," said the Judge,
"he is guilty to whichever party he may belong. He is not, however, guilty of a 'political' offence, but of devoting himself to an
activity which the legislature has declared to be incompatible with
the proper performance of his duties."
The Judge's hatred of official corruption, or even unintended
favoritism, is well illustrated by a case in which he defined the
'Duffy v. Cooke, 21 Pa. D. R. 613 (1912).
Act of i9o6, P. L. i9,§ 2.

"Act of i9o6, P. L. 83.
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duties of a city official with respect to bids on public work 4 5 saying:
"A municipal officer, after he has opened and computed
the bids must sedulously avoid saying ot" doing anything
that ordittity ingenuity may interpret as a hint to a bidder
that he has lbst the cbntract unless he lowers his bid, whether
by abatement of price or addition of new items. If a man
of ordinary intelligence will understand his word or act as
such a hint, even the absence of intent in the utterer or doer
will not make it lawful.
"
(c) Suffrage and Taxation
The felatitfiship ot taxation to the right of suffrage is
treated by judge Sulzberger with characteristic insight and erudition, in a case which involved the question whether an applicant
for registration at the polls must himself pay the poll tax, or
whether it is permissible to have anothe- person pay the poll tax
for the voter. 48 The applicant contended that he was qualified if
the tax had been paid, whether he had or had not paid it himself.
The basis of this argument was that, as taxes yield revenue, the
only concern of the state regarding any tax is that the revenue
shall be collected.
The Judge conceded that taxes yield revenue, but contended
that there may, nevertheless, be certain forms of taxation which
have other and more important purposes. In support of this
contention, he cited the ancient Jewish Shekel-Tax, as follows:
"The Bible (Numbers 1, 46: Exodus 38, 26) furnishes
us an example of an ancient commonwealth which compiled
its census of males liable to military duty by collecting from
each a half-shekel tax, and the count of the half-shekels established the military contingent of the respective districts of
the country. As such tax was accompanied by the imposition of arduous duty, there is small likelihood that any district would ordinarily strive to swell the list, though in modem times the 'padding' of muster-lists for purposes of profil
is not totally unknown."
"Ryan v. Ashbridge, io Pa. D. R. 153 (90i).
"Flick v. Woodruff, 21 Pa. D. R. 137 (1912).
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In the case before him, the Judge realized that the object is
to make an accurate muster-list or census of all males qualified to
vote. He said:
"In this census are involved liberal privileges instead
of onerous duties. It is conceivable that interests might
arise which would favor the swelling of such a census list
beyond the actual number of votes, since by such means civic
power might be accessible. To attain such an end, persons
of ample means might find it desirable and cheap to expend
some thousands of half-dollars. By such means they might
disturb the proper balance of power between various districts of a city or state, and give one faction an advantage
over another. Viewed in that light, it is seen that, though
the revenue derived from the poll tax is a necessary incident
of the taxation, yet it is not its purpose. On the contrary, its
purpose is defeated unless we prevent revenue in excess of
that produced by the actual number of qualified voters, and
hence unauthorized persons are debarred from paying the
tax.
Judge Sulzberger then reviewed the whole course of legislation in Pennsylvania with reference to personal registration, and
concluded as follows:
"The right of suffrage is derived from our constitution
and laws, and no man has ever been qualified to exercise it
at any time in our history unless he was a taxpayer. ...
"The intimate association of the tax with elections forbids any other conclusion than that the payment of it by any
other person than the taxpayer himself is an illegal payment
of an election expense.
"
In the few typical cases that have been cited in which political problems were involved, Judge Sulzberger displayed a thorough familiarity with the constitutional and political history of
the State of Pennsylvania and of our federal government. He
also evinced a relentless hostility toward the politically active and
the corrupt office-holder, and toward the questionable practice of
politicians paying the poll-tax of voters and thus indirectly buying
their support.
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CASES ON INDUSTRIAL AND EcoNoMic PROBLEMS
It is not at all surprising that Judge Sulzberger, presiding
over a court in a large industrial center, should have had before
him for adjudication numerous cases involving fundamental
questions of economics and business. The extension of the limits
of Philadelphia, the growth of its population, and the developmerit of its industries, gave rise to controversies in which the
Judge could not rely on authorities expressly in point, but, in approa-hintg the questions involved, was guided chieflly by his
owl views as to how the general welfare of the community might
best be promoted.
(a) The City and its Growth
A case, decided in 19Io,47 presented the conflict, occasioned
by the extension of the territorial limits of the city, between industry and agriculture, between urban and rural interests. The
plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain the defendant from conducting a bone-boiling plant located on a plot of ground situated
miles south of the regularly settled portions of the city, on the
Schuylkill River, in a district which originally had been a farmtrucking region, but which for some years had been invaded by
business enterprises not adapted to be carried on in the heart of a
city. The plaintiff's house was about a thousand feet away from
the defendant's building. The Judge said:
"This conflict between trucking and manufacturing is
not a battle begun and ended in a day, but a continuous process by which the greater values of land used for mercantile
and manufacturing purposes slowly compel the agriculturalist to remove his farm from the city to the country.
"Instead of being detrimental to the value of plaintiff's
property, the introduction of such plants as have been mentioned, including the defendant's, greatly enhances the pecuniary value of the land in the whole district. In short, the
plaintiffs really complain of the substantial advances of their
neighborhood from farming to manufacturing.
"That this change from country to city has its disadvantages is true. For instance, streets will be laid out and
"Shetzline v. Layer, ig Pa. D. R. io25 (1gio).
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the farmhouses standing in the way of their opening will be
razed; noises, great and unaccustomed, will be brought in;
smoke, cinders and other disagreeable incidents of advancing
civilization will darken the air; and, as in this case, new
noisome smells will mingle with the ancient ones which have
been familiarized, if not endeared, by long suffering.
"But for these conditions no one man is responsible.
People who have farms near a city, in getting the advantage
of enhanced money values, must also expect to suffer the
concomitant disadvantages. The balance, after all, is greatly
in their favor.
"We think that the district in question has now established itself as a district of disagreeable trades, and that whoever goes there or is there cannot ignore the fact."
Ever mindful of the progressive character of the law, and
loath to have this decision of his used as a precedent in the future
when an advancing population might again change the character
of the district, the Judge warned:
"The time may come in the future when population, advancing in that direction, shall have the right to make these
disagreeable plants move on; but that time has not yet arrived."
The growth and shift of population frequently bring into
conflict the peace and comfort of private residents with the busi48
ness interests of neighboring landowners.* In a leading case,
Judge Sulzberger considered the rights of residents on North
Broad Street, Philadelphia, to restrain the owners of a lot on the
corner of Broad and Thompson Streets from erecting or maintaining thereon a moving-picture theatre. The defendants' title
to the lot was subject to a restriction which was dated 1858, and
which inured to the plaintiff's benefit, "that no building for any
offensive occupation shall at any time be erected upon said lot."
The Judge declared that the only ground on which the plaintiff could maintain his bill is that the maintenance of a movingpicture theatre is an offensive occupation within the meaning of
" Burk

v. Kahn & Greenberg, 22 Pa. D. R. 691 (1913).
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the restriction in the defendants' deed.
lows:

He proceeded as fol-

"At the date of the covenant (1858) and for more than
a century before, there had been theatres in Philadelphia.
Their existence was known to all and their activity prized
by many. It is true that a respectable section of the community have always looked upon them as incitements to
frivolity and perhaps worse. The great majority, however,
decline to accept this opinion. It is certain that the general
setlttment was aid is that giving theatrical representations is
not an offensive occupation.
"The genuine business progress of a street, steadily continued for many years, along many squares or blocks, cannot
be stayed. There is no sound reason in public policy for
gratifying the plaintiff's love of privacy, and the inadequacy
of the restriction under which he claims is such as to give
no warrant for equitable interference in his behalf. We may
not unduly stretch the meaning of plain words. The defendants' property is their own, with the full right to use, just
as the plaintiff's property is his. This right, however, does
not confer on either the power of dictating to his neighbor."
In both of the cases reviewed,-Judge Sulzberger adopted the
attitude that the growth of the city and of its business dare not be
retarded by an overscrupulous regard for the rights of individuals adversely affected thereby.
(b) The Corporationand the Law
Recent industrial and economic progress in America is
closely related to the development of the corporation, and it was
as chancellor in equity deciding cases involving corporate affairs
that Judge Sulzberger particularly showed his modern juristic
outlook.
In corporation law, those who may be called "legal fundamentalists" conceive of a corporation as a legal entity, an artificial
person entirely distinct from its members and its officers, whereas
the "modernists" have attempted to look through the fiction to
the fact and, so far as possible, to regard corporations, partnerships and other groups as similar in legal effect.
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In 1898, when the "legal entity" theory was in its full glory,
and long before the modernist conception of the law of corporations had received definite judicial recognition, Judge Sulzberger
espoused the cause of the factualists as against the fictionists. In
a leading case, decided in that year,4 9 the plaintiff, in his bill of
complaint in equity, charged that the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, one of the defendants, being the majority stockholder of
the Philadelphia and Erie Railway Company, so managed the
affairs and so interpreted the contracts of the latter company as
to destroy the rights of the minority stockholders in the Philadelphia and Erie Railroad. The plaintiff, a minority stockholder
in the said company, prayed the court to order the Pennsylvania
Railroad Company to render an accounting of certain matters of
business transacted during the period from 187o to 1896.
The Judge, in the course of a thorough discusssion of the
law and the facts of the case, showed that he had no respect for
any technical theory by which the rights of minority stockholders
might be destroyed. He said:
"The thought at the bottom of the bill is that the acquisition of a majority of the stock by the Pennsylvania
Railroad Company in itself operated to give to the minority stockholders, when dissatisfied, a right to come into court,
and, averring with as much precision as practicable why and
how their reasonable expectations of profits have not been
realized, demand an account upon general equity principles
and not upon the basis of contract.
"In the course of the discussion we have not been referred to any authority expressly in point, and it becomes
necessary, therefore, to approach the discussion of the question on principle.
"The view of the law is that a corporation is an organization of persons with common interests. Just as a partnership is based upon the mutual faith and confidence of the
parties in each other, so is a corporation organized upon the
theory that the parties thereto are devoted to the attainment
of the objects of the corporation. In order that a corporation may act efficiently, the natural and inevitable diversity
of opinion which obtains among men forbids the require"Wolf v. Shortridge, 8 Pa. D. R. i (I898).
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ment of unanimity among the stockholders as the prerequisite to corporate action. For the purposes of the business
or a corporation, the vote of the majority is the vote of the
whole. If, however, the majority should be a rival corporation, whose interest it is to increase its own profits, at the
expense of the corporation into which it has bought, a new
question is presented. Externally and formally, the conditions do not appear to be changed. If a rival railroad corporation has a right to own stock, it has the right to vote
upon it. By voting, it may elect any officers and directors it
chooses. In short, it may do any act that any other majority could do.
"The powers of a corporation are, however, like the
powers of an individual, limited by the consideration that
the rights of others may not be unlawfully invaded. A corporation for profit, owning a majority of the stock of another corporation for profit, cannot so manage the affairs
of the latter as deliberately to turn it into a corporation for
loss, itself appropriating the profit. If such an object were
avowed, it would be the duty of the chancellor to enjoin.
"If the accounting partner in a private partnership
should be found to have acquired a much larger interest in
a rival firm, and should be charged with so using his power
as to deprive his first firm of its legitimate profit and throw
it into the new firm into which he had entered, would it be
considered a sufficient answer in equity if he were to set up
an article of the partnership contract, by which it was stipulated that he should be the managing partner? The answer
would be immediate, that management excludes interested
mismanagement.
"The principles of right do not differ essentially,
whether men act as individuals or as corporations. We must
not allow the mere legal entity to disguise the fact that behind it are men subject to ordinary motives and temptations
to deviate from the proper course."
While it is true that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on
appeal reversed Judge Sulzberger in this case,5" the reversal being
based on the technical ground that the pleadings of the complainants were not sufficiently specific, there can be no doubt that the
opinion of the lower court is expressive of what would today be
1x95 Pa. 91, 45 At. 936 (igoo).
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generally regarded as the proper judicial attitude toward a corporation owning the majority of the stock of a competing company. Many of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court, in
which fraud perpetrated by the manipulation of corporate stock
has been severely scored, will be found to have their inspiration
in the opinion of Judge Sulzberger, an opinion that was set aside
because the Supreme Court was not ready, in 1897,. to uphold it.
In another important case, 51 the rights and obligations of
public utility corporations are fully treated. The i 3 th and 15th
Street Passenger Railway Company of Philadelphia filed a bill
of complaint in equity against the Broad Street Transit Company, praying for an injunction to restrain the defendant from
laying and operating a double-track passenger railway on Broad
Street. It appeared that the plaintiff corporation had leased
away its entire property for 999 years. The Judge held that although technically the plaintiff company had the right of reversion at the expiration of the term of the lease, it had no real tangible interest in the matter in controversy. He said:
"The object of a railway franchise is to operate a railway for the accommodation of the public, and the duty so to
operate it is imposed on the corporators. Failing such duty,
forfeiture results.
"In the development of the business of railroading, it
soon became apparent that the public interests would be subserved by converting fragmentary bits of railroad into larger
systems. Hence, the statutes authorizing connections, mergers and leases, all of which pursue one and the same policy.
So soon, however, as a railroad is merged, or leased, the public duty of the prior owners of the merged or leased road is
practically imposed on another, and reciprocally the direct interest of the public in the merging or leasing corporation is
virtually at an end.
"The function of a leasing road then becomes a private
matter, the business of its corporators being merely to collect
(under the inexact name of rents) stipulated dividends on
their shares, not as a return for public service rendered by
them, but by another. The public interest is obviously transferred from those who yield their trust to, those who assume
it, and the former ought not to become active for the mere
purpose of hindering their substitutes from performing their
public duty."
"1Railway Co. v. Transit Co., 13 Pa. D. R. 8o8 (19o4).
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Judge Sulzberger declared that the argument of the plaintiff
corporation that its right to "reversion," which was to accrue
nearly a thousand years hence, amounted to a substantial interest
which the cou't ought to safeguard, should not be taken seriously.
He said:
"It rests on a false analogy with the English land law
and its elaborate fictions, devised for great political ends, but
having no basis in the nature of things or in sound logic or
reason."
It is interesting in this connection to compare the language
of Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes of the United States Supreme Court, who, in a recent case declared: "But the law as to
leases is not a matter of logic in vacgo; it is a matter of history
that has not forgotten Lord Coke." 52
Perhaps the explanation for the Judge's repudiation in this
case of a well-established principle of English land law may be
found in this concluding sentence of his opinion:
"This is not the case of a public-service corporation that
fears the impairment of its activities, but of individual
stockholders who see an opportunity to increase the value of
their shares on the Bourse."
Sitting in the Court of Common Pleas, Judge Sulzberger
frequently considered applications for charters for corporations
organized not for profit. He always imposed such conditions
and limitations as would protect the interests of the public, and
frequently scented dangers that would ordinarily have escaped
the attention of less communally-minded jurists.
In one case decided in I9o9, 53 he prevented the incorporation
of what he conceived to be an association of merchants tending
to restrict trade and commerce. The by-laws of the proposed
corporation provided "that the membership shall consist of an individual member of any firm or copartnership, an individual
officer of any corporation, or any individual engaged in the busi"Gardiner v. Butler & Co., 245 U. S. 603 (iqi8).
"In re The Decorative Trades Association of Philadelphia, 18 Pa. D. R.

503 (i9o9).
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ness of supplying commodities for use in the decorative trades,

provided, however, that but one individual member of any firm
or corporation and one individual officer of any corporation
(which shall include the credit man of such corporation) shall be
entitled to membership."
Judge Sulzberger had previously ruled that membership of
such a corporation had to be limited to natural persons and could
not include firms and corporations as such. lie said:
"That this corporation, if established, would be a tradeguild, whose real unit of membership is a business establishment and not natural persons, is obvious. Were this not so,
the limitation set forth would not have been adopted or
thought of.
"That the association of capable persons skilled in a
particular trade may make for its improvement and for the
advantage of the community is obvious. Better methods and
processes may from time to time be suggested, and the quickening influence of personal intercourse will tend to multiply
and perfect such suggestions. The law favors such educational endeavor.
"The law, however, does not favor-any association of
merchants tending to restrict trade and commerce, nor does
the act of assembly contemplate the incorporation of & union
of trading establishments as such. In carrying out public
policies it will not allow mere verbal conformity to be an
efficient substitute for full and whole-hearted compliance
with the spirit of the act of assembly. If we were frankly
to incorporate firms and corporations by name, we would be
doing no more than if, avoiding the use of their names, we
incorporated one individual representative of each. The
effect would be the same. The moral, intellectual and educational qualifications of members would not be the main factor of usefulness in the new association. There might
be two, three or more proper men in any one of the constituent corporations, yet all but one would be ineligible. The
purpose which inspires this rejection of valuable material
for membership is clear enough. No one firm or corporation is to be more powerful than another. If, however, the
object of the incorporation were the increase of useful
knowledge, there could not be too much of that sort of influence. The inference is irresistible that in some way the
proposed corporation wishes to regulate trade and commerce
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in the articles made, bought and sold by the constituent firms
and corporations.
"There is no law authorizing incorporation for such a
purpose, and perhaps it is not going too far to say that the
purpose is either in restraint of trade or in favor of a tendency to monopoly, which would make it unlawful."
The several opinions involving corporations that have been
reviewed portray their author as a man bent upon throwing aside
the technical quibbles and fictions that have encumbered the law
of corporations, upon preventing the manipulation of corporate
stock, upon frustrating the attempt to use the corporate entity for
the purpose of restraining trade and establishing monopoly, and
upon protecting the public interest at all times.
(c) Employer and Employee
A judge can most readily, if not most accurately, be identified as reactionary or progressive by a study of his decisions dealing with the rights and obligations of wage-earners in relation to
their employers particularly, and to society generally. Judge
Sulzberger, in his most significant contribution to Hebraic scholarship, his lectures on "The Status of Labor in Ancient Israel,"
proudly declared that "a great movement for the protection and
improvement of the laboring mass was initiated in Israel more
than three thousand years ago, and continued to promote its life
and literature, becoming indeed a part of the mental constitution
of the people."
The sanctity of human labor and the interest of society in the
free exercise thereof were emphasized by Judge Sulzberger in a
case decided in I9OO,5 4 in which the plaintiff, who owned a laundry, tried to restrain the defendant, a former employee, from securing for another employer, customers whom he had served
while in the plaintiff's employment.
It appeared that the plaintiff had engaged the defendant under a written contract which provided: (a) that the defendant
was to drive the plaintiff's wagon, serve the customers and make
"Seward v. Shields, 9 Pa. D. R. 583 (Igoo).
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returns of the money collected; (b) that he should increase the
number of plaintiff's customers, it being understood and agreed
that "such increase of custom shall be forever the custom" of
the plaintiff; (c) that he would give the plaintiff not less than
one week's notice before leaving his employ, and, after leaving,
he would not serve any customer whom he served while in plaintiff's employment; (d) if he should serve any customer within
one year after leaving his employment, the defendant authorized
the plaintiff to restrain him by injunction issued out of any court
of equity.
Judge Sulzberger, in a very significant opinion, said the following:
"An examination of the contract shows that the defendant was employed for no specified time or fixed wages. The
utmost duration of the employment which the defendant can
claim by interpretation of the contract is one week. The
wages, not mentioned in the contract, were actually $io per
week. The defendant had continued in the plaintiff's employment for about twenty months.
"The evidence did not show that the plaintiff had any
customers whose names and addresses he confided to the defendant, but rather that the defendant's business was to
procure work for the plaintiff from anybody who could be
induced to give it to him, and that he had himself procured
the customers respecting whom the plaintiff makes his complaint."
Judge Sulzberger declared the question involved to be of
great importance. He said:
"The defendant is a workingman, hired for ordinary
wages for one week to drive a horse and wagon and secure
customers for the plaintiff."
And he asked:
"Is this, even when coupled with the nominal one dollar, sufficient consideration to warrant a court of equity in
restraining the defendant, by preliminary injunction, from
the exercise of his working powers for one year?
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"Contracts of this kind are not favored by law and still
less by equity. Man's duty to society requires him to
exert all his activities for his own and, incidentally, for the
common good. Cotracts to hamper'or destroy this activity
nipst, ,erefpre, h4ve a strong J]sis if they are to be supported. In te case before us this basis is lacking. What
has the plaintiff given the defendant as a consideration for
aandoping his natural right to unhampered activity? The
plaintiff says (a)'he has employed him, (b) he has given
him a dollar, (c) he has paid him wages of $io a week.
These, separately or together, do not, in our opinion, constit4e sti, cient consideration for so important a sacrifice. The
nWeie eiploy'ment of o'e man by an'ther constitutes no consderation zbhiateer. At that point the values on both sides
The man wants to be employed, the emare eqtpva~en
ployer wants the man. The consideration of one dollar being merely nominal, can have no effect where substantial consideration is indispensable. The wages of $IO a week are not
shown to be aying but ordinary wages for so much work,
and hence are not consideration for the abandonment of a
valuable right in addition.
The courts of Pennsylvania, however, have consistently
adopted a position dianetrically opposed to that of Judge Sulzberger in this case, and have uniformly held that mere employment is sufficient consideration to warrant a restraining order 5
The decision of Judge Sulzberger was affirmed by the Superior
Court, 56 but on purely technical grounds. The real issue in the
case was evaded by the appellate tribunal.
Here, again, we have an illustration of the Judge's disposition to slight' or to overrule legal precedents which had been
founded on principles regarded by him as no longer applicable to
the present state of society. He was, however, motivated by a
desire to give the particular wage-earner the right to earn a livelihood and not by any yearning for abstract social reform.
His anxiety to break through legal fiction and his concern
for the wage-earner were also illustrated in a case decided in
"Opinion of Martin, P. I., in American Ice Co. v. Luff, 12 Pa. D. R. 381
(i9o3), citing numerous Pennsylvania and English authorities.
18 Pa. Super. 384 (igo).
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1896, 57 where a mechanics' lien, filed by a builder, was attacked
by the owner because the mechanic was alleged to have waived
his right to file the lien. The written contract contained a printed
provision under which the mechanic might properly file his
mechanics' lien claim, and also contained a written provision under which, standing alone, the mechanic could not file a lien. It
was argued that the rule of evidence that a written clause is paramount to a printed one governed the case and that, therefore, the
mechanic could not file his lien. Judge Sulzberger says the following with respect to this phase of the case:
z
"Where there are two clauses absolutely contradictory
and repugnant, the natural reason cannot give effect to either.
They neutralize each other. It is urged, however, that there
is a legal rule of construction which removes the difficulty,
namely, the rule that where the written and printed portions
are repugnant to each other, the printed form must yield to
the deliberate written expression. But this rule of interpretation is merely a technical device, whereby the harmonizing
of contraries, which to the natural reason is impossible, becomes possible by a legal fiction. Legal fictions, however,
are invented for the sake of justice, and will not be raised
so as to operate to the detriment of any person, or in destruction of a lawful vested estate.

.

....

This extreme decision in which an established rule of evidence was set aside because in the opinion of the Judge, an injustice might be done to the mechanic, was of course reversed by
the Supreme Court. 58
Judge Sulzberger's concern for the rights of labor was
pointedly demonstrated in two cases, 59 in which he declared un
constitutional the Acts of the Legislature of 19o9 and 1913, pro-

viding for the assignment of wages as security for loans made by
workmen.

Speaking of the Act of 19o9, he said:

"The Commonwealth Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. Ellis, 5 Pa. D. R.

33 (1896).
1
x92
Pa. 321, 43 Atl. 1034 (1899).
"Application of Jefferson Credit Company for License, 18 Pa. D. R. 634
(19o9), and Foster's Application, 23 Pa. D. R. 558 (94).
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"In the act before us, the borrower is, as a wage-earner,
segregated from the rest of the community. A new law is
made for him. The source of his future earnings is known.
He is employed for wages by a particular man, who, when
the anticipated service has been rendered, will become his
debtor. It is these future services which are irrevocably
pledged.
"The effect of the act, therefore, is to evade the operation of the exemption law, so far as wage-earning borrowers
are concerned, and, moreover, to extend this waiver from
things that he has in possession to things that he expects to
get from his labor in the future.
"The main defect of the act, however, is that it classifies men and not transactions, and in so classifying them it
enacts a law against wage-earners only, which does not effect
the rest of our citizens. That this law operates to bind the
heads of families to future service by creditors is an odious
incident of such classifications.
"The assent of husband and wife which the law demands does not relieve'the statute from the charge of hostility to the constitution. The fundamental law places first of
all the freedom of the citizen as an end more important and
more sacred than even the freedom of contract.
"We entertain no doubt that the placing of wageearners as a separate class upon whom this act of assembly
is to operate is unjustified, and that the act is special legislatiorA, offensive to the letter and the spirit of the constitu"
tion, and therefore of no validity. 60
When the legislature in 1913 repealed the Act of 19o9 and
adopted another statute aiming to effectuate the same result,
namely, the pledge of wages of the future labor of workmen for
an indebtedness previously incurred, the Judge said:
"The first section of the Bill of Rights is still a living
force in this Commonwealth. One of the inherent and indefeasible rights thereby guaranteed is the enjoyment and defence of liberty. It is a declaration against slavery in any
form, however modified or disgtised. The distinction between a man's acquired estate (that is, his property) and his
'In Comm. v. Lynch, 22 Pa. D. R. 454 (1913), Judge Baldridge disagrees
with Judge Sulzberger as to the unconstitutionality of the Act of igog. The
Act was repealed by the Act of 1913.
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personal earning power by labor. (that is, his freedom) is
carefully preserved and sedulously safeguarded. A man
may pledge his property, but not his person. However great
may be the volume of police power entrusted to the legislature, it cannot extend to the impairment of the mere right
of a man, even though he be a debtor, to earn a living by
labor and to apply his earnings to the support of himself
and his family. This right is so fundamental and so necessary, not only for himself and his family, but also for the
Commonwealth, that it cannot be waived by the man himself. It is true that the freedom of contract is a great and
necessary right, but it has its limit. And this limit is reached
and passed when a man's future labor is pledged to pay his
past debts, with the consequence that he and his family are
rendered liable to fall from the status of free citizenship into
the degradation of pauperism.
"After mature consideration, we cannot resist the conclusion that there is no power of contract in the individual
and no power of legislation in the general assembly to authorize a man to pledge or assign the wages of his future labor, and that the attempt of the legislature to exercise such
power is a futile assault upon the very basis of our frame of
government."
Judge Sulzberger feared that whole communities of wageearners would practically become peons, slaves of their employers, if such statutes were declared valid. He regarded any legislation that debased labor as contrary to the fundamental law of
the land, and it was due to his strong stand that workmen's wages
are today non-pledgeable in the State of Pennsylvania, for his
decision was later affirmed by the Superior Court,6 1 and was still
62 later followed by the Supreme Court.
It will be seen from an examination of the cases reviewed
that Judge Sulzberger, in dealing with social, political or economic
problems, never aimed at the reorganization of society. He was
not a reformer, unless, perhaps, he may be spoken of as "one of
God's passionless reformers." He never sought to put an entirely new principle in the place of the existing state of things. On
'6o Pa. Super. 8 (i915).
a Comm. v. Young, 248 Pa. 458, 94 AtI. 141 (1915).

JUDGE MAYER SULZBERGER

the contrary, he endeavored to maintain the status quo, and
aimed simply to arrive at just conclusions in the particular cases
coming before him.
In framing his opinions he appears to have been anxious,
wherever possible, to bring the case within the scope of some
broad general principle. Occasionally, in order to accomplish this
result, and at the same time do real justice as between the litigants,
he resorted to forced interpretations, fanciful analogies, and even
legal homiletics. He was frequently ingenious in the selection
and application of precedents to support a theory, but he was
always above the pedantry and affectation of profuse citations of
decisions. He did not hesitate to ignore precedents where their
application might lead to bizarre and unsocial conclusions.
He always kept in mind the distinction between "law" and
"right" and he used law as a means to achieve right as an end. In
one case,6 3 this distinction is especially marked. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania had reversed the Court of Common Pleas
No. 2, which had entered a judgment for the defendant despite
the verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiff. The order of the
Supreme Court in reversing the lower tribunal directed it "to enter such judgment as law and right required." Judge Sulzberger,
in a dissenting opinion, said:
"If the word 'judgment' is to be understood in its
proper legal sense, it means here a judgment on the verdict.
The entry of such a judgment would comply with the direction of the Supreme Court, in so far as it would be in accordance with 'law.' The order, however, is 'to enter such
judgment as law and right require.' We are all of opinion
that the verdict is unjust, and 'right' would require us to set it
aside. Where law and right (equity) are thus in conflict, a
judgment in accordance with both is impossible.
"
Above all, Judge Sulzberger shows himself a sterling humanist. He considered law not the master, but the servant of
man. He regarded law not as something fixed and immutable,
but as a living, growing organism, having its origin in human
a

Sloan v. Phila. & Reading R. R.,

20 Pa. D. R.

987

(IgI).
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nature, in the habits, practices, beliefs and convictions of men and
women, in the mores of the day. He was a student of human nature in all its manifestations, and he humanized jurisprudence
wherever he touched it.
Louis E. Levinthal.
Philadelphia,Pa.

